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ABSTRACT 
The pre commit ment approach to law en force ment is inappropriate 
as a positive theory of crime an d punishment becau se it is 
inconsistent with the institut iona l  st ructure of U.S. law enforcement . 
We develop a formal mode l which integrates t heories of opt imal 
sanctions, individual criminal behavior and the allocation of effort 
t o  apprehen sion, and impose s credibility const raints on t he choice of 
sanct ion-- i.e . ,  given t he se verity of a crime an d the individual 
characteristics of the criminal, the sanct ion impose d must be opt imal 
from socie ty's perspect ive , after the crime has been commit te d. 
CREDIBILITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Jennifer F .  Reinganum and L ouis L. Wilde • 
We give t hem pleas because we know the ju dge is going t o  give 
them a light se ntence anyhow. The judge doe s that because he 
knows t hey're going t o  be out anyhow, from the department of 
corre ctions. I just don't think anyone really has t he ultimate 
responsibilit y and looks at the social conseque nces of what 's 
going on in t he crimina l just ice system. (Barry Zavah, quoted in 
Jackson, 1984, p. 2 95) 
1. INTRODUCTION
Gary Becker's seminal work on t he e conomics of crime and 
punishment (1968) has had an e normou s and last ing impact on t he way in 
which we vie w public policy toward crimina l behavior. Any analysis of 
criminal behavior and policy response s to it , whe the r in t he 
discipline s of sociology, psychology, philosophy or law, is compelled 
to discuss Becker's formidable argume nt s (if only to describe the 
aut hor's reasons for reje cting his approach; e.g., Wit tman, 1974 : 
Stern, 1978) . Rese arche rs in law and e conomics have adopte d t he 
approach wholehe arte dly and have ge ne ralize d it in se veral directions 
(Harris, 1970; Brown and Reynolds, 197 3; Block and Heine ke , 1975; 
Heine ke , 1975: Polinsky and Shavell, 1979) . Although Becke r's theory 
was e sse nt ially normative , the addit ional hypothesis t hat socie ty is 
indeed acting in an optimal manne r gene rate s a positive theory of 
criminal behavior and law en forcement . An e xcellent surve y of this 
work and empirical applications of it can be found in Pyle (1983) . 
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While Becker's approach has mu ch to recommend it, particularly 
t he fundamental ide a that crime is amenable to economic analysis, it 
has one important drawback for the purposes of positive analysis : it 
supposes t hat socie t y  choose s its enforcement policy to maximize a 
measure of social welfare ,  anticipating potential criminals' optimal 
be havior in t he face of t hat policy. That is, socie t y precommit s 
itself to an enforcement pol icy. The relationship be t ween t he "supply 
of offense s" and a given e nforcement policy has come to be known in 
t his literature as the "dete rrence funct ion." The reason why su ch an 
approach may be inappropriate as a positive theory of crime and 
punishment , at least for the case of the United States, is t hat 
socie t y  determines gu ilt or innocence , as well as t he extent of 
sanctions, after a crime has been committed.1 Thus an enforcement
policy which appears optimal before the commission of a crime will 
generally not be optimal afte r t he crime has be en committed. In the 
lan gu age of dynamic optimization, such a policy will not be 
" dynamically consistent " (Kydland and Prescot t ,  1977) ; alternatively, 
in t he langu age of game theory, such a policy will not be "subgame 
pe rfe ct" or "credible" (Selten, 1975: Kreps and Wilson, 1982 a) . 
We have e lse where applied the notion of se que ntial rationalit y 
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to a game -the ore tic analysis of tax compliance (Graetz, Reinganu m and 
Wilde , 1986) , and it is our purpose in this pape r to begin e xploring 
its implicat ions in other le gal conte xt s .  The role o f  credibility 
constraint s for law enforce ment is illust rate d most e asily in t he case 
of an offense which is punishe d by imprisonment . Assuming t hat all 
individuals are potent ially de te rrable and t hat crime is socially 
ine fficient , 2 the ideal precommit men t  policy is to de ter all crime by 
employing an arbitrarily small probabilit y of apprehension and an 
arbit rarily long se ntence . Howe ver,  prison sentences impose a varie t y  
o f  cost s upon socie t y. Thu s it is reasona ble for criminals t o  dou bt 
whe t he r  socie ty would actually carry ou t t he threat of a ve ry long 
se ntence given the y  are unlucky enough to be apprehende d .  In other 
words , there is a cre dibility proble m .  Thus the existing 
inst itut ional st ructure ,  which allows for substantial ex post 
fle xibility in the dete rmination of sanctions, will re duce the e xtent 
of dete rrence which is available to socie ty. In orde r to develop a 
positive the ory of crime and punishment in light of this inst itut iona l 
st ructure ,  it is ne ce ssary to incorporate credibilit y const raints.  
In this pape r we deve lop a formal mode l which integrates 
theorie s of optimal sanctions, individual criminal behavior and t he 
allocation of ef fort to apprehen sion, and impose s t he sort of 
credibilit y const raints discusse d above . Specifically, this will 
re quire that given the se ve rity of a crime and the individual 
characteristics of the criminal, the sanct ion impose d must be optimal 
from socie t y's pe rspe ctive ,  afte r the crime has been commit ted. Un der 
plausible assumptions about social ut ilit y, we find that the subgame 
perfect equilibrium se ntence sche dule varie s direct ly with the 
se ve rity of the crime and inversely with a measure of the opportunit y  
cost o f  incarce ration . Unlike the ideal precommitment policy , 
sentence lengt h  is inde pendent of the probability of apprehen sion . 
Ant icipation of the equilibrium sentence schedu le can re sult in a 
nonmonotonic re lationship be t ween the criminal's opportunity cost of 
incarce ration and t he e quilibrium se ve rity of his pre fe rre d crime . 
I f  all individuals are potentially de te rrable (and crime is 
socially ine fficient ) , the precommitment approach implie s no crime in 
e quilibrium,  while our mode l incorporat ing ex post discretion in the 
se t ting of sanction levels implies crime s of non trivial se ve rit y. 
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Thus e x  post discretion limit s t he e xtent of de terrence. Howe ve r, the 
requirement t hat the sanction policy be credible doe s not imply that 
socie t y  has no instrument of de te rrence at all. The equilibrium 
sanction policy de ters in the se nse that it re duces t he se ve rity of 
crime . Moreove r, t he probabilit y of appPehension is an important 
dete rminant of the se verit y of crime ; increasing this probabilit y also 
induces individuals to commit less se riou s crime s .  
There are both formal an d informal ways in which some type s of 
precommitment can improve socie ty's well-being, when use d  
appropriately .  First , the le gislation o f  mandatory pe nalties can 
improve welfare; howe ve r, naive effort s t o  enhance dete rrence (such as 
t he often sugge sted "solution" of a small probability of apprehension 
accompanie d by an e xt remely large penalty) will be at least partially 
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thwarted by socie t y's re fusal to convict . Some evidence for this 
phenomenon, known as " jury nullification, " can be found in Kalven and 
Zeise l  (1966, Ch. 21) , Wilson (1975, p. 187) and Jackson (1984, p .  
152-53) . Second, the appointment or e le ct ion o f  judges with 
particular pre ference s is anothe r means of precommitment. Third, 
socie ty may find it possible t o  precommit through informal mean s which 
rely on the fact t hat law enforcement is an ongoing proce ss. For 
instance , the use of " trigge r strategie s" or the desire to e st ablish a 
"reputation for de te rrence "  might sustain an out come which wou ld not 
be cre dible abse nt re petition of the game. We argue t hat trigge r  
strategies and reputation-building are unlikely to be both feasible 
and optimal, at least for sustaining the ideal precommitment policy. 
Howeve r, the highe r the probabilit y  of apprehension, the lower is t he 
fully dete rring sentence .  Thus maintaining a highe r probability of 
apprehen sion might also enhance the sustainability of the fully 
de te rring policy via t he use of t rigge r  strategie s  or re putation­
building. 
In Section 2, we de scribe the e xtent of discret ion enjoye d by 
judges and jurie s. In Section 3 we prese nt our basic mode l and 
findings , and Section 4 cont ain s an illust rative e xample. Section 5 
considers t he allocation of resource s t o  apprehension. Sect ion 6 
evaluates the feasibilit y and opt imality of variou s de te rrence-­
enhancing strategie s ,  including the use of mandat ory sen tence s  and the 
possibility of rendering credible the de te rring policy through 
repeate d play. Section 7 summarizes ou r re su lts, discusse s related 
literature and suggest s  avenue s for future research, including 
empirical implications of our approach. 
2. THE EXTENT OF DISCRETION 
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Our analysis is base d upon t he obse rvation t hat as 
represe ntatives of socie ty police , prose cut ors, judges and jurie s  
enjoy considerable discretion in the e xt ent t o  which the y  en force t he 
law. In t his analysis, we will be specifically conce rne d with t he 
discret ionary power of judges and juries t o  de te rmine conviction and 
t he e xt ent of sanctions. Whethe r  sanctions are de te rmine d by ju dges 
or juries depends on t he jurisdiction and t he crime .  Some crime s 
aut omat ically re ceive bench trials. When juries are use d, in some 
jurisdict ions (most ly in t he Sou t h) t he jury de te rmine s both guilt or 
innocence and t he e xtent of sanctions. In most states and in Federal 
cases, the jury convict s or acqu it s and the judge de te rmine s 
sanctions. Howe ve r, jurie s often have some control ove r sen tencing by 
their abilit y to recommend lenie ncy or to reduce t he charge , 
particularly in case s which involve que stions of int ent or the use of 
t he death penalty. For example , Kalven and Z eise! (1966, p. 59-60) 
remark that "In a fair number of case s more t han one charge is 
presented to the jury. The multiple charge may either be 
concurrent , such as assault and carrying a concealed weapon, whe re the 
de fendant may be convicte d  on either or both of the charge s; or the 
mult iple charge may arise from a doubt as t o  whe ther the de fendant 
commit te d only a 'lesse r inclu ded offense , '  such as manslau ghter 
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instead of murde r. Here the defendant can be found guilty of only one 
of the se crimes, not of both. Le ase r  offe nse s are include d most 
frequently where a specific intent is at issue , e .g., intention t o  
kill as against intention only t o  harm . " 
Although criminal statutes often specify allowable sanct ions, 
they typically le ave a gre at de al of discretion to whome ve r ultimately 
impose s the sanct ion. For example , in I llinois the Unified Correct ion 
Code classifie s  fe lonies int o 6 classes : murde r, Class X (rape , 
deviate sexual assault , aggravated kidnapping for ransom, home 
invasion) , Class 1 (aggravate d kidnapping not for ransom, arme d  
robbery) , Class 2 (voluntary manslaught er, kidnapping, robbery, 
burglary, arson) , Class 3 (involunt ary manslaughter, aggravated 
battery, forge ry, perjury and t heft , which includes fraud, extortion 
and embezzleme nt ) , and Class 4 (re ckless homicide, bigamy, pandering, 
theft of a firearm) . The st atut es which guide the trial judge in 
sentencing specify the following penalties. For murde r, not le as than 
20 nor more than 40 years; if accompanie d by aggravating 
circumst ance s ,  a term of natural life may be imposed; if unaccompanied 
by mitigating circumst ances, t he de ath pe nalty may be imposed. For a 
Class X felony, not le as than 6 nor more than 30 years; for a Class 1 
felony, not le ss than 4 nor more than 15 years; for a Class 2 felony, 
not less t han 3 nor more t han 7 ye ars; for a Class 3 fe lony, not le ss 
t han 2 nor more than 5 ye ars; and for a Class 4 felony, not le ss t han 
1 nor more than 3 ye ars. The trial judge is required to spe cify his 
reasons for imposing the particular se nte nce , including any mitigating 
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or aggravating factors which were conside re d .  Alt hough se ntences may 
not be e xt ende d be yond those authorized by t he st at utes,  the j udge may 
elect t o  re duce the se nte nce to probation, conditional discharge , 
pe riodic imprisonme nt or a fine (Source : Smith-Hurd I llinois 
Annotate d Statutes, Chapter 38, Se ction 1005-8- 1) . 
There is no observable agency contract bet ween socie t y  and 
jurie s; that is, socie t y  has no means of disciplining juries who 
disregard or subvert the law. To a great ext ent this is t rue of 
judges as well. According to the Smith- Hurd I llinois Annotat ed 
Statutes, "a judgme nt as to proper sent ence depends upon many fact ors, 
such as defendant's prior record, credibilit y,  demeanor, gene ral moral 
charact er, mentality, social environm ent , habit s and age" (Section 
1005-8-1, Note 13, People v. Cozzi, 1981) . However, the e xact weights 
to be placed upon various matters relevant to sentencing are up to t he 
trial judge- -"It is not t he function of appellat e court t o  se rve as 
sentencing court, and it will not subst itut e it s judgment for that of 
t rial court merely because it would have balanced appropriate factors 
differently" (Section 100 5-5- 3, Not e 501, People v. Pace, 1981) • All 
in all, the case for subst antial discretion seems compelling.3 
3. THE MODEL
The main point of this pape r can be made in t he conte xt of a 
simple mode l in which an individual has a single opportunity to commit 
a crime of variable seve rit y. 4 We assume a thre e- st age process in 
which socie t y  allocates resource s to appre hension, individuals decide 
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upon the se verity of the ir crime and subse que nt ly socie ty, through a 
represe ntat ive such as a judge or jury, impose s sanctions in the form 
of prison se ntences upon offende rs who are apprehended and convicte d. 
For our basic mode l, we assume that all me mbers of socie t y  have the 
same pre ference s, so it is irre levant whe t he r  socie ty's represe ntat ive 
is a judge or jury.5 This structural de tail will turn out t o  be 
important when we conside r t he e f fe ct s  of re pe ate d play. Since 
socie ty's representative move s last in t his game, it s prefe rred 
se nte nce length will ge ne rally depe nd upon the se verity of the crime 
and other characte ristics of the offender. I ndividuals, anticipating 
t he behavior of socie t y's represe ntative, choose their pre ferred 
crime . Finally, anticipating the behavior of both criminals and it s 
own represe ntative , socie t y  allocates resource s t o  apprehe nsion. We 
model the resulting probability of apprehension as inde pe nde nt of the 
se verity of the crime and t he characte ristics of the criminal. This 
corresponds t o  choosing the e xt ent of police presence , with 
apprehension being an increasing function of the number of police. 
Alte rnatively, one could mode l the allocation of resource s t o  
apprehe nsion t aking place after a crime has occurred, but wit hout 
knowledge of the offe nde r's characte ristic. Each of t hese mode ls has 
some merit and de se rves inve stigation. To make our point in the 
simplest possible conte xt ,  we assume that socie ty move s first , 
choosing a constant probability of apprehension, de noted by p. 
Give n t he timing assumptions of our mode l, and the requireme nt 
of subgame perfection, it is appropriate to conside r first t he last 
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st age ,  in which a represe ntat ive of socie t y  (i.e ., a judge or jury) is 
assumed t o  choose it s pre ferred se nte nce le ngth, give n that a crime 
has bee n  commit te d and the offe nde r has been apprehe nde d and 
convicte d. Social utility following apprehe nsion is assume d to be a 
function of t he le ngth of the se ntence, t he se verity of the crime and 
t he cost s of imprisonment.6 Let x denote t he le ngt h of a sentence and
y t he se ve rity of a crime. We assume that individuals are inde xe d b y  
a characteristic q which may best b e  inte rpret ed a s  a n  indicator of 
the private and social cost of imprisonment. For example, q might be 
t hought of as the criminal's alternative wage in lawful act ivity. 
Although socie t y  nee d not attribute the same disut iity to a criminal's 
incarce ration as doe s the criminal himse lf, it is reasonable t o  
include i n  t he social utility function some measure o f  the loss of 
foregone lawful se rvice s of the criminal while in prison. We assume 
that t his utilit y function is se parable int o a bene fit function b (x,y) 
and a cost function c(x,q) . The benefit function may re present 
utility derived from venge ance, ret ribut ion, or compensation of the 
specific victim or society in general (which is also t o  be conside red 
a victim) . The cost function summarize s opportunity cost s and 
incarcerat ion cost s. Letting subscript s denote partial de rivative s, 
we assume that b (O ,y) = b (x,0 ) = b x(x,O )  = 0 :  that is, society derive s 
no bene fit (net of possible prope rt y recove ry) from apprehension and 
conviction if no penalty is impose d; moreove r, it derives no be ne fit 
from imprisoning individuals who have commit ted no crime . In 
addition, we assume that b (x,y) is t wice continuously differentiable 
with bxx < o, by > O, and bxy O for x, y > O: the benefit function
is strictly concave in sentence length, and both the benefit and the 
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marginal benefit bx increase with the severity of the crime. Finally,
we assume that for each y 
A 
0, there exists x(y) � m such that 
A A 
bx(x, y) > O for x < x(y), bx(x,y) = 0 for x = x(y) and bx(x,y) < 0 for
x > �(y), The value �(y) maximizes the benefits from incarceration
(without consideration of any associated costs) and is thus 
interpretable as the "just" or "optimal retributive" sentence, 7 Our
A 
assumptions regarding bxx and bxy imply that x'(y) o; the optimal
retributive penalty increases with the severity of the crime. 
Of course, the sentence which is actually imposed may deviate 
from the optimal retributive sentence because society must rationally 
consider the costs of sentences as well as the benefits. We assume 
that c(x,q) is twice continuously differentiable with ex > o, cxx � O,
cq > 0, and cxq > o. That is, costs increase at a nondecreasing rate
with sentence length, and both total and marginal cost ex increase
with q. We assume that society bears no cost if it imposes no 
penalty; that is, c(O,q) = o. Society's representative is assumed to 
choose the sentence length x so as to maximize social benefits net of 
costs, denoted J(x;y,q).8 We will refer to the solution to this 
problem as the credible sentence schedule, and will denote it by 
x•(y,q). Since J(x;y, q) is strictly concave in x, if x•(y,q) is 
interior, then it is the unique solution of 
o. (1) 
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Alternatively, if Jx(x;y, q) < o for all x given (y,q), then
x•(y,q) = O. Given our assumptions on the benefit and cost functions, 
it is easy to show that x•(O,q) = 0 for all q; that is, individuals 
who commit no crime receive no punishment. When x•(y,q) is positive 
A 
so is bx, implying that x•(y,q) < x(y) for all (y, q); the credible
sentence is always less than the optimal retributive sentence. For 
ax•(y,q)/ay -bxyf Cbxx - cxxJ 
ax•(y,q)/aq -cxq/ Cbxx - cxxJ
O; and 
o. 
That is, x•(y,q) varies directly with the severity of the 
crime y and inversely with the opportunity cost parameter q. Subgame 
perfection implies that the credible sentence schedule cannot depend 
upon the probability of apprehension; that is, x•(y,q) does not depend 
upon p. The classic result from the precommitment approach--that one 
can substitute more severe penalties for a lower probability of 
apprehension--is not characteristic of the model without 
precommitment. 
The fact that x• increases with y means that the credible 
sentence schedule is characterized by a "marginal penalty" of the sort 
called for by Stigler (1970) in a precommitment model. One only needs 
a marginal penalty if not all crime is deterred under the optimal 
enforcement policy. While this is not true in some classic instances 
of the precommitment model (Stern, 1978), it will be true in our model 
because not all crime can be credibly deterred. Given that some crime 
13 
will occur, a marginal penalty can at least reduce the extent to which 
more severe crimes are committed. 
The inverse relationship between x• and q has several possible 
interpretations; if q is thought of as a level of skill or alternative 
wage, then one could interpret this result as implying that a 
physician defrauding Medicaid would receive a shorter sentence than a 
welfare cheater of the same magnitude. Similarly, a middle- or 
upper-class murderer would receive a shorter sentence than his lower-
class counterpart. If the alternative wage declines with the extent 
of prior criminal activity, then (all else equal) the criminal with 
the longer record will receive a longer sentence. 
Now consider the problem of an individual who is contemplating 
criminal behavior. Recall that p is the probability of apprehension, 
which for simplicity is taken to be constant. What is the optimal 
crime y for an individual of type q7 Let U (y;q) denote the expected 
utility of an individual of type q who commits a crime y, and 
anticipates a sentence of x• (y,q) if apprehended. We assume that 
U (y;q) takes the form 
U (y;q) pv (x• (y,q),q) + (1 - p)u (y,q), ( 2) 
where v (x• (y,q),q) measures utility in the event of apprehension and 
u (y,q) denotes utility if not apprehended. This specification seems 
appropriate in cases of property crime with recovery. Alternatively, 
for property crime without recovery or for crimes like assault, rape 
and murder, a more appropriate formulation would be 
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U (y;q) pv ( x • ( y , q) , q) + u ( y , q ) • (3) 
That is, the criminal enjoys the utility u (y,q) simply by 
committing the crime and suffers the utility v (x,q) only if 
apprehended. For concreteness, we will use the formulation in 
equation (2) . It is straightforward to replicate the analysis using 
the formulation in equation (3) . 
We assume that v (x,q) is twice continuously differentiable 
with vx (x,q) < 0, vxx (x,q) < 0 and vxq (x,q) < 0 :  utility decreases at
an increasing rate with the length of sentence, and the marginal 
utility of sentence x decreases with the individual characteristic q. 
The utility function u (y,q) is assumed twice continuously 
differentiable with uy (y,q) > 0 ,  uyy (y,q) � O and uyq (y,q) � O: the
utility associated with a successful crime increases at a 
nonincreasing rate with y, and the marginal utility of crime y 
decreases with the characteristic q. This is consistent with the 
interpretation of q as an alternative wage. In order for this 
specification to make sense, we also require that 
v(O,q) = u (O,q) = w (q); that is, the criminal suffers no disutility if 
he receives a sentence of length O, and enjoys no additional utility 
if he commits no crime. His utility in the absence of criminal 
activity is measured by w (q), where w (q) is an increasing and concave 
function. 
The individual of type q chooses y to maximize his or her 
expected utility, yielding the following first- and second-order 
necessary conditions for an interior maximum. 
ls 
pvx<x•, q)ax•/ay + (1 - p)uy (y, q) � o
pvxx<ax•/ay>
2 + pvx<a
2x•/ay2> + (1 - p)uyy < o.
( 4)  
( S) 
We will assume that equation (S) holds. If (4) holds with a 
strict inequality for all y, then the optimal severity is y• (q,p) = O; 
that is, no crime is committed. For example, this might be the case 
if p is sufficiently close to 1 and x• is sufficiently sensitive to Y 
in a neighborhood of y = o. When the equilibrium crime is nontrivial, 
solving equation (4) with equality yields y• (q,p); then equations (4) 
and (S) imply that 
sgn ay•/ap 
sgn{pvxq<ax•/ay) + pvxx<ax•/aq) (ax•/ay)
+ pvx<a
2x•/aqay) + (1 - p)uqyJ.
Thus the severity of crime depends inversely upon the 
probability of apprehension p. The dependence of severity upon the 
characteristic q is more complicated, involving four distinct 
expressions; the first and last are negative under our assumptions and 
previous results; the second is positive, and the third is ambiguous 
without further restrictions. Thus there may be a nonmonotonic 
relationship between the characteristic q and the severity of the 
associated crime. This possibility arises because of the anticipated 
dependence of x• on q. 
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4. EXAMPLE
The following example is consistent with the assumptions of 
our basic model and shows that a solution to the two-stage problem can 
exist. More general existence questions will not be addressed here. 
For computational convenience, we assume that ethical considerations 
do not limit the length of sentence (that is, �(y) = m for all y) and
we ignore discounting. 
Suppose that the potential criminal work3 a day job and 
receives a wage of q; he contemplates how much to steal by night, Let 
y denote the magnitude of the theft, Once the criminal is apprehended 
and convicted, and assuming that y is recovered, the benefits function 
b (x,y) represents the extent to which imprisonment "compensates" 
society and the victim for the forced transfer. A plausible form for 
the benefit function is b (x,y) ayxP, where p e (0,1) . Let 
c (x, q) = (c + q)x; the parameter c represents incarceration costs per 
period and q represents society's op portunity cost of incarceration 
(lost wages from lawful activity), Maximizing the difference between 
these functions yields the credible penalty schedule 
x• (y,q) = [apy/ (c + q)]l/ (
l-p), Sentence length decreases with the
cost parameters c and q and increases with the index of severity y. 
It also increases with the parameter a, which is a measure of the 
saliency of crime in general. 
Consider now the criminal's decision problem. Assuming that 
the criminal has a linear utility function over his lifetime wealth, a 
sentence of x years yields a utility of v (x, q) = q - qx, while 
successful theft of y yields utility of u (y, q) = q + y. If p is the 
probability of apprehension, and the penalty schedule x• (y, q) is 
anticipated, maximization of expected utility U (y, q) implies that 
y• (q,p) = C<t - p) (t - P>/qpJ<t-P>/Pccc + q)/opJt/P.
The optimal severity y• decreases with the saliency of crime 
o, and with the probability of apprehension p; it increases with the 
cost parameter c. More interesting is the result that ay•/aq is 
positive, zero, or negative as q exceeds, equals or is less than 
c (t - P>/p. Thus there is a nonlinear relationship between the 
alternative wage and the severity of crime. Those with relatively 
high and relatively low alternative wages commit the more serious 
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crimes, with those in the middle choosing less serious crimes. Those 
with a low alternative wage are not deterred by long sentences at low 
cost; similarly, those with a high alternative wage are not deterred 
by the high cost because they expect and receive short sentences. 
Although we have not been able to establish the following as a 
general property of equilibrium in our model, an interesting result 
emerges from consideration of this example. Despite the fact that 
sentence length is discriminatory, the total equilibrium penalty in 
terms of wealth or disutility is not. That is, if two types q1 and q2
commit the same crime y, then qtx• (y, q1) = q2x• (y, q2). To see this,
note that two types qt and q2 commit the same crime if and only if
y•Cq1,p) = y• (q2,p). Algebraic manipulation of this equality shows
that it implies q1x• (y•, qt) = q2x• (y•, q2). However, it is not true
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that q1x• (y, qt) = q2x• (y, q2) if qt and q2 might (in equilibrium)
choose different crimes. Thus all criminals who are observed to have 
committed the same crime will suffer equal punishment if apprehended. 
Whether this result extends to more general cases is not obvious, but 
risk neutrality on the part of the criminal is inessential; the same 
analysis applies to the constant absolute risk aversion utility 
function over wealth w given by u (w) = -exp(-w). What is clear is 
that if the total (equilibrium) penalty is to be nondiscriminatory, 
then the sentence length itself must discriminate among criminals with 
different values of q who commit the same crime y. 
S. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO APPREHENSION 
We assume that the allocation of resources to apprehension 
generates a uniform probability of apprehension p, and is done before 
the commission of any crimes. Thus society is able to influence the 
severity of equilibrium crime because the severity of crime function 
y• (q,p) depends upon the parameter p. Similarly, the equilibrium 
sentence received by the individual of type q, 
x•• (q,p) = x• (y• (q,p), q), will depend upon p through y• (q, p). Let 
F (q) denote the frequency distribution of the index q over its support 
[g,q) C (0 , m) . 
Let D (y) denote the social disutility associated with the 
crime y; we assume that D (·) is twice continuously differentiable with 
D' > O and D" > o. There is some controversy over the inclusion of 
the criminal's utility from crime in the social utility function. 
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Becker (1968) discusses "the social value of the gain to offenders," 
and Polinsky and Shavell (1979) use a utilitarian social welfare 
function which results in a problem more reminiscent of external 
diseconomies than of criminal activity. Stigler (1970, p. S27) argues 
that there is little evidence "that society sets a positive value upon 
the utility derived from a murder, rape or arson. " While Posner 
(1985, p. 1197) is willing to admit the criminal's utility from crime 
into the social utility function, he argues that it is almost surely 
outweighed by the disutility of the victim. "Now as a matter of fact 
it is a pretty safe empirical guess that most such conduct does create 
net disutility • • •  it is unlikely that every disutile experienced by 
the wretched victim confers an equal and opposite utile on the 
offender." Following Posner, we assume that every crime y generates 
net disutility to society (where "net" means net of both the 
criminal's utility from crime and society's utility from punishing the 
apprehended offender). That is, we assume that 
D (y) > R (y) + J (x• (y,q);y,q) for all (y,q), where R (y) summarizes the 
extent of recovery in the case of property crimes. 
Anticipation of the equilibrium relationships x• (y,q) and 
y• (q,p) implies that society expects to suffer a loss of D (y• (q,p)) 
for each criminal of type q, and to recoup a gain of R (y•,q,p) + 
J (x•• (q,p);y• (q,p),q) with probability p. If k (p) denotes the cost of 
sustaining the probability p of apprehension, then expected social 
utility can be written as follows. 
ESU (p) = -JD (y• (q,p))dF (q) + pf[R (y•) + J (x•• (q,p);y• (q,p),q))dF (q) - k (p).
Assuming that x•, y•, and p• are all interior, the optimal 
value p• satisfies9
ESU' (p•) = -Jo• (y•) (ay•/ap)dF (q) + fCR (y•) + J (x••,y•,q))dF (q)
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+ p•fCR' (y•) + Jy<x••,y•,q)J (ay•/ap)dF (q) - k' (p•) = o. (6) 
Note that dJ/dp = Jx (ax••/ap) + JY
(ay•/ap) + JP
; the first term is 
zero whenever x• > O, and the last term is always zero. This accounts 
for the term J (ay•/ap) in the expression E SU' (p•).y 
This equation implies that there are two sources of benefits 
from increasing the probability of apprehension which must be balanced 
against two sources of cost. The first term represents the benefits 
from increased deterrence. A higher probability of apprehension 
induces criminals to choose less severe crimes, which reduces the 
social loss from crime. The second term summarizes the benefits 
derived from increased apprehension and punishment. The third term, 
which is negative (and is thus a cost of increased apprehension), 
describes the loss of utility associated with punishing lesser crimes. 
That is, because individuals are induced to commit less serious 
crimes, society derives lower utility from apprehending and punishing 
these criminals. The last term is the marginal resource cost of 
apprehension. 
We have already discussed the possibility that police 
discretion may result in a reallocation of resources across crimes 
which would result in a nonconstant probability of apprehension. 
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Another source of variation in the likelihood of apprehension ia that 
the same amount of effort devoted to various crimes can result in more 
or leas apprehension. Typically the perpetrators of more serious 
crimes are more easily apprehended. More serious crimes tend to 
involve the victim directly, leaving more clues and often eye 
witnesses. This could be modeled by specifying a given level of 
enforcement effort e, which generates a probability p (y,e) of 
apprehension for crime y. Plausible assumptions regarding p (y,e) 
include p (O,e) = p (y, O) = 0, p > O, p > O, and p > o. y e ey That is,
respectively, if no crime is committed, the criminal cannot be 
apprehended; if no effort is expended, no criminals can be 
apprehended; perpetrators of more serious crimes are easier to 
apprehend; an increase in effort increases the probability of 
apprehension and this increase is greater the more serious ia the 
crime. An example is p (y,e) = ey/ (1 + y). In this case, the criminal 
chooses y to maximize his expected utility, anticipating the effect of 
his choice upon p (y,e) and x• (y,q). Again this yields a crime 
severity function y• (q,e) which may be nonmonotonic in q, and which 
now depends inversely upon enforcement effort e. Society is assumed 
to choose enforcement effort e to balance the benefits of greater 
deterrence and apprehension against the costs of enforcement. 
6. DETER RENCE-ENHANCING STRATEGIES 
Recall that since we have assumed that 
D (y) > R (y) + J (x• (y, q);y, q) for all (y, q), in our model society would 
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in principle prefer to deter all crime.10 However, the discretion to
determine conviction and/or sentencing after a crime has been 
committed will tend to restrict society's ability to do so. To see 
this, note that for each (y,q,p) triple, there is a shortest y­
deterring sentence x0 (y,q,p) which is defined implicitly by
pv (x0, q) + (1 - p)u (y, q) pv (O, q) + (1 - p)u (O,q) w (q). 
That is, x0 (y, q,p) is the length of sentence which equates the
expected utility which type q derives from crime y (given the 
probability of apprehension p) to the utility derived from no crime 
w (q). It is straightforward to verify that our previous assumptions 
imply that x0 varies directly with the severity of crime y and
inversely with the probability of apprehension p.11  For our example,
x0 (y, q,p) = (1 - p)y/pq. Thus if the schedule x0 could be enforced,
no crimes would be committed. Moreover, in this case society faces 
the usual incentives to lower p. which is costly, and to compensate by 
raising x0 (y, q,p), which is costless since there will be no crimes to
punish. 
Despite the attractiveness of the implied outcome (a crime­
free society), discretion at the point of sentencing renders it 
unattainable. Yet there are opportunities, both formal and informal, 
for society to improve its overall utility by enhancing the deterrence 
features of its law enforcement policies. For example, one 
opportunity involves a mandatory sentence schedule linking sentences 
to the severity of the crime and the characteristics of the offender. 
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The latter link is crucial; there may exist no mandatory sentencing 
policy which is both independent of q and improves society's o verall 
welfare. Moreo ver, the choice of the correct mandatory sentence 
schedule may be quite complicated. For example, suppose that the 
deterring sentence schedule x0(y, q, p) were made mandatory, but a jury 
determines guilt or innocence; such a po licy will be at least 
partially thwarted by the jury's refusal to co nvict. 
This phenomeno n, which is known as "jury nullificatio n, H is 
reasona bly well-do cumented. For example, Kalven and Z eise! (1966, Ch. 
21) offer some co ntemporary evidence as well as the following 
historical note (p. 311) . "A memorable chapter in the history of the 
English jury concerns its respo nse to excessive punishment in the 
early nineteenth century when England had an incredible list of some 
230 capital o f fenses. The jury then felt the death penalty so 
disproportio na te for most crimes that it co nspicuously refused to 
co nvict. Finally, in 1819, the bankers themselves petitioned 
Parliament to remove the death penalty from the crime of forgery, 
since it had become almost impossible to obtain a convictio n for that 
crime. " Jackson (1984, pp. 152- 53) describes a relatively recent 
mandatory sentencing experiment. "In the early 1960s the federal 
government introduced penalties of mandatory life sentences without 
possibility o f  paro le or suspensio n for transferring narco tics : you 
didn't even have to sell the stuff; a junkie co uld give a hit to a 
sick pal and be culpable. Few dope dealers of any significance were 
punished under that legislatio n, though there were a number of 
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pro secutio ns. The first man co nvicted and sentenced to life was 
Gilbert Mora Z aragoza, a junkie with lo w grades on his intelligence 
test scores who was asked by a close friend to let him have some do pe 
because the friend was going into withdrawal. • • • There were a few 
more such gro ssly irrelevant co nvictio ns and sentencings, and then the 
number of convictions under that legislatio n began falling o f f  at an 
alarming rate. Juries simply refused to believe that 
transferring a cap or two to a pal earned life in the penitentiary. 
Juries engaged in what the courts call 1ury nullification : even in 
light of uncontro vertible evidence, the juries brought in not-guilty 
verdicts anyway; they found the law unworthy of the defendants. 
Judges granted motions to suppress they previously would have rejected 
out of hand. The most immediate effect o f  the federal legislatio n was 
that federal prosecutors were so fearful of losing even very good 
oases in co urts that they began accepting o utrageously reduced charge 
bargains. Subsequently Congress repealed the penalties, went back to 
what seemed more reasona ble sentences_, and juries o nce again started 
delivering the usual guilty verdicts. " 
Nullificatio n behavior need not be co nfined to juries. Wilso n 
(1975, p. 187) remarks that "in Great Britain, where judges had less 
discretio n in imposing the death penalty than they do in the United 
States, the number of murderers found insane--and so spared the 
gallows-- dropped sharply after the death penalty was abo lished in 
1965. It is hard to believe that there were fewer insane perso ns in 
Britain after abolitio n of the death penalty; what apparently happened 
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was that the authorities no lo nger felt it as necessary to protect the 
accused from penalties when the penalty was no longer death. No o ne 
should assume that any judicial outcome can be made truly 
'mandatory'-- discretio n removed from o ne place in the criminal 
justice system tends to reappear elsewhere in it. " 
Within the co ntext of our formal mo del, given the schedule 
x0(y,q,p) , the judge or jury will convict q of y if and o nly if 
J(x0(y,q,p) ; q,y) � J(O; q,y) ; otherwise the criminal will be acquitted. 
Since Jxx < O, there is a longest sentence x(y,q) which will result in 
co nvictio n; the sentence schedule r will be referred to as the 
harshest conyict able sentence schedule. 12 For our example (assuming y 
is reco vered even if the o ffender is not co nvicted) , 
i(y,q) = [ay/(c + q) ]l/(l- P> , The judge or jury will refuse to 
convict an individual of type q o f  a crime of severity y whenever 
x0(y,q,p) b x(y,q) ; that is, whenever (1 - p) y/pq b [ay/(c + q) ]l/ (l-p) . 
This inequality holds whenever the probability of apprehensio n p, the 
saliency of crime o, the o ppo rtunity cost of incarceratio n q or the 
severity of the crime y is sufficiently small, or when either of the 
co st parameters c or q is sufficiently large. I f  the sentence 
schedule x0 were to be impo sed, what would actually be observed is x0 
when x0 � i and o o therwise. There is a unique value o f  y for each q 
which equates the two schedules; call this y0(q,p) . Then examinatio n 
of the criminal's expected utility functio n for the example implies 
that the crime functio n will be y0(q,p) . It is straightforward to 
show that for p < q, O < y0(q,p) < y•(q,p) for all q. Thus the naive 
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deterrence strategy which co nsists of legislating the schedule x0 do es 
work to some extent, but it is limited by the discretio nary power to 
refuse to co nvict. Moreover, this policy need not impro ve overall 
social utility because although deterrence is enhanced, no criminals 
are ever penalized and this reduces social utility. 13 The schedules 
x0, x•, and x are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Our basic model treats criminal activity and law enforcement 
as a "one-shot" game. Since sanctions are required to be credible, 
they cannot have a "pure deterrence" component; nevertheless, credible 
sanctions do deter to the extent that they induce individuals to 
commit less serious crimes. In reality, the law enforcement game is 
repeated with the same and/or different criminals, which suggests the 
po ssibility that current penalties might foster future deterrence. 
The assumptio n that each criminal has o nly o ne opportunity for crime 
does not rule out repeated games arguments, since these are equally 
applicable to a sequence of identical criminals, each of whom has o nly 
o ne oppo rtunity for crime. However, if society's preferences are 
known, simple repetitio n of the one-shot game has as its o nly 
equilibrium an infinite sequence of o ne- sho t equilibria; a more 
sophisticated institutio n is needed to sustain any o ther policy. 
For example, repeated games arguments which rely on the use o f  
"trigger strategies" can o ften render credible a policy which would 
not be credible in the absence of repetitio n (Friedman, 1971) . 
Similarly, it is po ssible that inco mplete informatio n on the part of 
criminals may enable society to establish a "reputatio n for 
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deterrence" by repeatedly impo sing the deterring sentence schedule 
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982b) . However, these sorts o f  arguments are very 
sensitive to both the identity o f  so ciety's representative and, in the 
latter case, to the assumed form o f  crimina ls' uncertainty . 
For instance, suppo se that so ciety's representative is a jury 
which is responsible for bo th convictio n and the extent of sanctio ns. 
Since a jury is co nvened o nce for the specific case, no single jury is 
engaged in the repeated game. But co nsider the following "trigger 
strategy": impose the schedule x°'(y,q,p) = max(x0(y, q,p) ,x•(y,q) } if 
it was imposed in the last case; o therwise impo se the credible 
schedule x•(y,q) . The schedule x"' completely deters crime, but allows 
society to choose its most preferred sentence when this exceeds the 
minimum deterring penalty x0• Notice that once a jury fails to impo se 
the deterring sentence x"', society must switch to p• and criminals to 
y•(q,p•) in anticipatio n o f  the reversio n to the credible sentence 
schedule x•. I f  all juries follo w  this rule, the deterring policy 
(p,xm) can be sustained in repeated play if and o nly if, for every 
co nceivable case (y,q) , the value o f  maintaining the trigger exceeds 
the value of reversio n.  That is, 
J(xm; y,q) + (�) (-k(p) ) 2 J(x•; y,q) + (�) ESU(p•) , 
where 6 is the jury's disco unt factor .  Alternatively put, for each 
case (y,q) , the co st of maintaining the trigger must be less than the 
associated benefit. 
J(x•; y,q) - J(xm; y,q) ! (�6�) [-k(p) - ESU(p•) J. 1 - 6 (7) 
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I n  evaluating the likelihood that xm will be sustained, it is 
necessary to co nsider both its feasibility and its o ptimality. I t  
seems unlikely that prospective juro rs are sufficiently well- informed 
about past cases to use such a strategy; at the least they would have 
to reco nstruct the previous case in order to determine whether or not 
the proper penalty was imposed (recall that they would need to kno w q 
as well as y and x) . I f  such a policy were feasible, it is necessary 
to determine whether inequality (7) is satisfied. The right- hand-side 
of (7) is the net gain to society from deterring future crime, and it 
is bounded abo ve as a functio n o f  p since p do es not affect ESU(p•) . 
The left-hand-side represents the current co st o f  deterring future 
crime; it is the difference between (ex post) utility under the 
credible and deterring sentence schedules. But the minimum deterring 
sentence x0 is that value of x such that 
v(x0, q) = [w(q) - u(y,q) (l - p) J/p; moreover, w(q) < u(y, q) for all 
y > o. Thus the deterring schedule xm requires unbounded disutility 
as p nears 0, even for small values o f  y. Recalling that the co st to 
society c(x, q) reflects in some measure the co st v(x,q) to the 
criminal, it is plausible that unbounded disutility to the criminal 
implies unbounded disutility for society. For example, suppose that 
on account of its very low probability of apprehension, the deterring 
sentence for bicycle theft is prolonged torture; even if a single 
imposition of this sentence would deter all future crime, society may 
recko n this too great a co st. Since the left- hand-side of (7) seems 
likely to be unbounded as p nears 0 ,  the ideal precommitment policy of 
a very small probability of de te ction and a very long sente nce is 
unlikely to be sustainable by repe ate d play. Of course , the greate r 
is p, the lowe r is the deterring schedule and the more like ly it 
become s that ine quality (7) will be satisfie d. 14 
2 9  
One way for socie ty to de velop a reputation for de terrence in 
this conte xt would involve assuming that all juries prefe r (e x post) 
the deterring se ntence xm(y, q, p) or all juries prefer the credible 
se ntence x•(y, q) , with the crimina l being uncertain as to which is 
true . Then all juries are e f fe ctively alike , and the behavior of one 
jury can plausibly be take n to reflect on the common prefe rence s of 
othe r juries. In this case , one is in a most favorable situation if a 
single round of play is sufficie nt to e stablish one's reputation. I n  
this pleasant circumstance , the same inequality (7) must hold. Thus 
the reputation building mode l is subject to the same difficulties 
regarding optimality, and reputation building is e ve n  le ss attractive 
if more periods are nee de d  to establish a reputation. A more 
plausible specification of criminal uncertainty would be that each 
jury prefers eithe r  the deterring sentence schedule xm(y, q, p) or the 
credible se nte nce sche dule x•(y, q) , with criminals being uncertain 
about the proportion which prefers the de te rring schedule. In this 
case , the behavior of one jury cannot be take n as providing 
information about the preference s of juries as a whole , and no 
reputation for de te rrence can be e stablished. 
I f  socie ty's age nt is a judge , the fe asibility of using 
trigge r strate gie s seems somewhat more like ly. Judges might be 
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presume d to be be tter informed about the previous decisions of their 
colle ague s than are jurie s. This information is ne ce ssary since no 
judge can punish himse lf; judge s must be "paire d" so e ach can punish 
his partne r for failures to impose xm. The optimality of sustaining 
xm by me ans of trigge r strategie s is again de termine d by whe the r 
inequality (7) holds. Reputation building on the part of judges would 
rely on the assumption that some judge s pre fer (e x post) the de terring 
schedule while othe rs prefer the credible sche dule , with the criminal 
being uncertain about the relative magnitude s of the se groups. This 
uncertainty might provide all judge s with sufficient ince ntive to 
be have as if the y preferred the deterring schedule so as to build a 
reputation for de terrence . Again the optimality of reputation 
building rests on the fact that the bene fits of reputation formation 
must outweigh the costs. In the happy eve nt that only one round is 
needed to e stablish a reputation, we again nee d  only check that (7) 
holds. I f  more than one round is nee de d, (7) may hold and ye t it nee d  
not be optimal t o  e stablish a reputation for de terrence. The 
esse ntial e lement for sustaining deterre nce through repe ated play is 
the depe nde nce of strategie s upon the se ntencing history; ye t one of 
the most striking features of the e xisting criminal justice system is 
an almost complete lack of systematic se ntencing review. 
Finally, if individual membe rs of socie ty have dive rse 
preference s regarding se ntencing, one plausible me ans of precommitme nt 
is to appoint or elect judge s with particular prefe rence s, and simply 
allow them to e xe rcise their discretion. This argume nt doe s not apply 
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quite as well to the selectio n o f  juries, since opposing counsel will 
each try to screen out jurors who favor the other side. Thus even if 
it is po ssible to bias systematically the selectio n o f  j udges, the 
pro blem of jury nullificatio n is likely to remain. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The precommitment approach to law enforcement is inappropriate 
as a po sitive theory of crime and punishment because it is 
inconsistent with the institutiona l  structure o f  U. S. law enforcement. 
Moreover, under the assumptio n that all crime is potentially 
deterrable, it do es not seem to generate accurate predictio ns 
regarding the extent of criminal activity and sanctions. Recently 
bo th Posner (1985) and Shavell (198S) have argued that crime exists 
because some individuals simply canno t  be deterred with the number of 
undeterrabres rising as the pro bability of apprehensio n falls. I n  
this case, optimal sentences must reflect a balancing o f  the benefits 
of deterrence and the co sts o f  actually imposing sanctio ns (including 
the possible wro ngful punishment of inno cents) . This balance implies 
that sentence length should vary directly with the severity of crime 
and inversely with the co ats o f  impriso nment and the probability o f  
apprehension. Our alternative approach requires the penalties impo sed 
o n  co nvicted o ffenders to be optimal given that the crime has been 
committed. This implies a sentence schedule which varies directly 
with severity and inversely with the co sts o f  imprisonment; ho wever, 
the credibility requirement severs the tie between the probability of 
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detectio n and the penalty which is characteristic o f  the preco mmitment 
approach. Moreover, even the less extreme sentences implied by Po sner 
and Shavell's versio n o f  the precQmmitment approach will suffer a 
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1. There are of course some exceptions; in particular, mandatory 
sentencing laws do exist. The effects of these laws will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 6. 
2. See Polinsky and Shavell (1979) for a model in which some crime 
is socially desirable. 
3. One might argue that judges are in fact faced with optimal agency 
contracts which, despite the appearance of discretion, induce 
them to choose in all cases the appropriate penalty. However, 
such a contract would require that judges be rewarded on the 
basis of the appropriateness of their decisions. But, according 
to one observer of the contemporary criminal justice system 
(Jackson, 1984, p. 169) , "Judges are given enormous discretionary 
power by moat state and federal laws so punishments will be 
appropriate to the crime and the defendant. But no measure of 
that appropriateness has ever been made, nor shall one be. That 
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is because, under the present system, the only definition of 
appropriateness has been the judge saying 'That's what � think he 
deserves. '" 
4. This is in contrast to the approach in Becker (1968) , in which 
the choice variable of the potential criminal is the frequency of 
a given crime. 
S. There are many reasons why judges' and juries' preferences need 
not be consistent with social preferences (however determined) . 
To isolate the effects of credibility, we will assume that all 
agents of society have identical preferences. 
6. Given that the individual has only one opportunity for crime and 
has been apprehended and convicted, the requirement of subgame 
perfection implies that these are the only things on which social 
utility can depend. What happens at this point in the decision 
tree cannot depend upon anything that might or would happen at 
some other point. 
7. Several authors have rejected the economic approach to explaining 
sanctions. Stern (1978) argues that the economic approach cannot 
explain why punishments are not raised (since they deter crime in 
the standard approach) ; instead he argues that society baa a 
notion of the "just" punishment, which depends on the extent of 
the damage caused by the criminal. Wittman (1974) takes the 
optimal retributive punishment as given, and argues that justice 
decreases as actual punishments deviate from the retributive 
optimum. Our analysis, which takes an explicitly economic 
approach, is designed to be consistent with the notion of a just 
or optimally retributive punishment. We provide an explanation 
of why punishments are not raised (unlimited punishments are not 
credible, and hence do not deter), and we argue that the credible 
sentence will be less than the retributive optimum because of the 
cost associated with sanctions. 
8 .  We could have begun with the function J(x;y,q), but separating 
the objective function into benefit and cost components is 
intuitive and without significant loss of generality. 
9, To show that p• can be interior, we compute an example based upon 
the analysis in Section 4 assuming D(y) = y + 6yY and R(y) y. 
From Section 4 ,  J(x•;y,q) = q(q)y9, where 
q(q) = a(l - p)[ap/(c + q)Jp/(l-p) and 9 = 1/ (1 - p). Assuming 
6 > q(O) and y > 9 implies that D(y) > R(y) + J(x•;y,q) and 
D' (y) > R'(y) + Jy(x•;y,q) for al 1 ( y, q) • From Section 4 ,
y•(q,p) � .., and dy• /dp � _.., for all q as p � o. Moreover, 
R(y•) + J(x .. : y•, q) �Cl> and -D' ( y•) + p[R, ( y•) + Jy(x .. ;y•,q)J 
as p � O. Thus ESU'(O) > 0 so long as k'(O) ..,, implying tha: 
p• is strictly positive for the example. 
10. In this paper we take the usual economic approach in which 
preferences are defined only over the possible outcomes and not 
� _.., 
over the means by which the outcomes are achieved; that is, we do 
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not discuss here the ethics of deterrence--punishing an offender 
severely in light of the low probability of apprehension in order 
to raise the expected penalty perceived by potential offenders--
only its efficacy. 
11. The expression ax0/ay has the same sign as uy > o. The 
expression ax0/ap has the same sign as v(x0,q) - u(y,q) < 0 for 
x0,y > o. This follows from the relationships 
v(x, q) < v( O,q) u(O,q) < u(y,q) for x,y > o. Finally, the 
expression ax0/aq has the same sign as p(vqq - uq) + uq - w'(q). 
Under the plausible assumption that vq < uq � w'(q), the shortest 
y-deterring sentence x0 varies inversely with the characteristic 
Thus the key difference between x0 and x• is that x0 varies q. 
inversely with p while x• is independent of p. 
12. It turns out that in our example, every type of criminal is 
indifferent between facing the credible schedule x•(y,q) and the 
harshest convictable schedule x(y,q), although they choose 
different optimal crimes under these different schedules. 
13. The best mandatory sentencing schedule is the one which maximizes 
society's overall welfare, subject to being convictable. That 
is, society chooses p and x(y,q) to maximize an objective akin to 
the one in equation (6), subject to the constraints that the 
potential criminal chooses his preferred severity and that 
x(y,q) � x(y,q) for all (y,q). This is consistent with the idea 
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t hat a legislative body choosed t he penalty schedu le, 
anticipating t he possibilit y of j ury nullification. Although it 
is relatively st raight forward t o  st ate t his problem, it s solution 
is an open issue. 
14 . We know from t he Folk Theorem that if it were feasible for j uries 
t o  use trigger strategies, t hen the highest sust ainable social 
payoff will typically exceed t he payoff associat ed with t he 
credible pena lty schedule. How much bett er society ca n do in 
t his case, and exact ly what penalty schedule it would use are 
questions for fut ure research. 
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